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Abstract
We propose a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler
[1978] and Maskin [1999] according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto
efficient rule is Nash-implementable. To this end, we consider implementa-
tion through mechanisms that are deterministic-in-equilibrium while lotteries
are allowed off-equilibrium. For strict preferences over alternatives and un-
der a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, we build
simple veto mechanisms that Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social
choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness con-
ditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-
implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through
one of our simple veto mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Can one design some protocol that ensures that two players reach a Pareto efficient
agreement in equilibrium? The theorems of Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] and
Maskin [1999], at the outset of implementation theory, provide a negative answer
to this question: no deterministic mechanism, except dictatorship, can guarantee
that every Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient. In fact, there is a tension between
the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium at every preference profile and
those which ensure that each outcome is Pareto efficient. This impossibility, to which
we refer as the two-person implementation problem, is particularly striking since it is
based on a very mild set of assumptions.
We propose a solution to this problem based on a modification of the mecha-
nisms used for implementation. More precisely, we examine the consequences of
allowing lotteries off-equilibrium, while still ensuring deterministic outcomes in
equilibrium. That is, we consider Nash implementation through deterministic-in-
equilibrium mechanisms or simply DE mechanisms.1
Since we introduce lotteries, the notion of Pareto efficiency needs some qualifi-
cation (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001] for a discussion). Two classical defini-
tions are ex-ante and ex-post Pareto efficiency. A lottery is ex-ante Pareto efficient
if no other lottery Pareto dominates it, whereas it is ex-post Pareto efficient if no
alternative that can be selected by the lottery is Pareto dominated by some other
alternative. While we show that the possibility of ex-ante Pareto efficient implemen-
tation is severely limited, we establish that ex-post Pareto efficient implementation
is possible, by DE mechanisms, as soon as preferences over alternatives are strict.2
Our main result is that a SCR is Pareto efficient and Nash-implementable if and
only if it is a Pareto-and-veto rule: for some pair of integers v = (v1,v2) with v1 +v2 +1
being the number of alternatives, it selects all Pareto efficient alternatives that are
1To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to consider this idea with two players. See Özkal-
Sanver and Sanver [2006], Bochet [2007] and Benoît and Ok [2008] for related ideas. We could replace
lotteries with sets of alternatives and the results presented would be identical.
2The current results do not extend to the setting where the players are indifferent among several
alternatives. Indeed, as proved by Sanver [2006], no selection of Pareto set is (Maskin) monotonic
and hence can be implemented.
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not among the vi worst alternatives for each player i.3 The Pareto-and-veto rule with
vector v is denoted pvv .
The sufficiency part, rather than relying on classical integer games,4 builds for
each Pareto-and-veto rule pvv a simple veto mechanism, which we call a strike mech-
anism, that Nash implements pvv . A strike mechanism endows each player i with
vi vetoes to be distributed among the alternatives with, again, v1 + v2 + 1 being the
number of alternatives. The game is simultaneous and the outcome is a full-support
lottery over the non-vetoed alternatives. The best-response reasoning is straightfor-
ward: given the vetoes of his opponent, a player can induce any alternative non-
vetoed by his opponent as the outcome by adequately casting his vetoes. Thus, his
best response amounts to select his best element among the non-vetoed alternatives.
We prove that this game has pure strategy equilibria. Then, the nice feature of
best responses has three consequences. First, each veto mechanism is DE since a
unique alternative remains non-vetoed in equilibrium, otherwise there is a conflict
with best responses. Second, an equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient since other-
wise a player can always, by deviating, select a Pareto dominating alternative. Third,
the equilibrium strategies have a natural shape: if x is the implemented alternative
and vi is the number of vetoes, player i vetoes all alternatives preferred to x by his
opponent (say k alternatives) and he vetoes also vi − k among the alternatives less
preferred than x by his opponent. If both strategies veto disjoint sets of alternatives,
this forces each player to accept his opponent’s strategy. In any equilibrium, this
is case: the players veto disjoint sets of alternatives and only one alternative, the
implemented one, remains non-vetoed.
This result holds under the standard von Neumann and Morgenstern expected
utility framework and is even more general than that. It remains true under a mild
condition that we term “best-element bias”: for any set of alternatives, a player
prefers the (sure) lottery that consists of his most preferred element in the set to
3It is not the first time that Pareto-and-veto rules are found to be of interest in the literature:
Abreu and Sen [1991] (pp. 1016-17) present this class of rules as the main example that is virtually
implementable but fails to be Nash-implementable. In a setting where monetary transfers are al-
lowed, Sanver [2018] designs a direct veto mechanism that implements alternatives which are Pareto
efficient and preferable to some disagreement outcome by both players.
4Jackson [2001] summarizes some views on the limits of these games.
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any lottery with support in the same set. Furthermore, we characterize the class of
(ex-post) Pareto efficient social choice rules (SCRs) that can be Nash implemented
through these mechanisms. Importantly, the implementation result just relies on
the existence of a best-element bias for both players. It does not even require com-
pleteness5 or transitivity of the preferences over lotteries.
The necessity part is more involved. Here, the key concept is the veto power
generated by a mechanism: a mechanism µ endows player i with veto power over
some set X of alternatives if and only if player i has some strategy that prevents
any alternative in X to be selected with positive probability whatever his opponent
plays. As we show, any mechanism µ that ensures Pareto efficient outcomes must
endow each player i with veto power over every set of alternatives whose cardinality
does not exceed some integer v
µ
i with v
µ
1 + v
µ
2 + 1 being the number of alternatives.
This is a strong result which almost directly entails that only sub-correspondences of
pvv are Nash-implementable. The necessity is established on a domain of preference
extensions over lotteries that is rich enough to include specific extended preferences
that we label “priority” extensions. In words, a “priority” extended preference is
defined by the property that whenever all the elements of a set X are preferred to
all elements outside X, any lottery that put some weight (however small) on some
element of X is preferred to any lottery that puts no weight on X. For instance, the
domain of vNM preferences satisfies this requirement.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic notions.
Section 3 presents the strike mechanisms and show that the strike mechanism with
parameter v Nash implements the Pareto-and-veto rule with the same parameter.
Section 4 tackles the necessity issue. It shows that if a SCR is Pareto efficient and
Nash-implementable, then it is a Pareto-and-veto rule. Section 5 further studies the
game-theoretical properties of the proposed mechanisms and shows in particular
that their equilibrium are obtained through individual best-response dynamics. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the limitations of ex-ante implementation through DE mechanisms.
5See Schmeidler [1989] who underlines the importance of weakening completeness and writes:
"Out of the seven axioms listed here the completeness of the preferences [...] seems to me the most
restrictive and most imposing assumption".
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Section 7 presents a review of the literature and Section 8 makes some concluding
remarks.
2 Basic notions and notation
A set N = {1, 2} of two players faces a finite set A of n+ 1 ≥ 3 alternatives. We write
A = 2A for the power set of A and A =A\{∅,A}. The set of probability distributions
(or “lotteries”) over A is denoted ∆ = {p : A→ [0,1] |∑x∈Ap(x) = 1}. For each lottery
p ∈ ∆, we let supp(p) = {x ∈ A | p(x) > 0} denote the support of p. For each X ∈ A,
p[X] =
∑
x∈X p(x) stands for the probability that p selects an alternative in X. Let ∆uni
denotes the set of uniform probability distributions over the non-empty subsets of
A. Slightly abusing notation, we let {x} denote both the singleton set consisting of
alternative x and the lottery that selects x with probability one.
We define a “strike mechanism” as follows. Each player i ∈ N is endowed with a
non-negative number vi of vetoes, with v1 + v2 = n. The set
Mi = {X ⊆ A | #X = vi}
represents the sets of alternatives i can veto, and M = M1 ×M2 is the joint mes-
sage space. The mechanism µv : M → ∆uni associates to each pair of messages
m = (m1,m2), the lottery µv(m) that is uniform6 over the set
supp(µv(m)) = A \ (m1 ∪m2).
In other words, an alternative is uniformly drawn from the non-vetoed alternatives.
Note that, as v1 + v2 = n, the set m1 ∪m2 contains at most n elements, so that
supp(µv(m)) is always non-empty.
The set of linear orders over A is denoted by LA and its generic element i is the
preference of i ∈ N .7 The set of (strict) preference profiles over A is L2A = LA × LA
6Theorem 1 holds replacing the uniform distribution by any probability distribution with full
support over the non-vetoed alternatives.
7More precisely, one of x i y and y i x holds for any distinct x,y ∈ A while x i x fails for all
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with  = (1, 2) denoting a generic preference profile. We write
pe() = {x ∈ A | @y ∈ A : ∀i ∈N,y i x}
for the set of Pareto efficient alternatives at  ∈ L2A. Let L(x,i) = {y ∈ A : x i y}
be the (strict) lower contour set and U (x,i) = {y ∈ A : y i x} be the (strict) upper
contour set of x ∈ A at i∈ LA.
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping f : L2A → A. A SCR is Pareto efficient
iff f () ⊆ pe() for all  ∈ L2A. We say that f is a sub-correspondence of g and write
f ⊆ g whenever f () ⊆ g() for all  ∈ L2A.
In general, a mechanism is a function µ : M → ∆ with M = M1 ×M2 where
Mi , ∅ is the message space of i ∈ N . In order to properly define the game associ-
ated to µ, we do not need to extend preferences over the whole ∆ but simply over
µ(M) := {p ∈ ∆ | p = µ(m) for some m ∈ M}, the range of µ. In this paper, we only
consider mechanisms with finite ranges.8 For example, the set of uniform lotteries
over A, denoted ∆uni = {p ∈ ∆ | p(x) = p(y) for any x,y ∈ supp(p)} is finite. The strike
mechanisms, which play a central role in this work, have ∆uni as their range.
We let Pµ(M) stand for the set of binary relations over µ(M). A typical element of
Pµ(M) is denoted ∗i with ∗i being its strict part. We say that ∗i is an extension of i
when x i y =⇒ {x} ∗i {y}, ∀x,y ∈ A.
For a mechanism µ :M→ ∆ and a preference profile over lotteries ∗= (∗1,∗2), a
Nash equilibrium is a pair of messages (m1,m2) ∈M such that, for all m′1 ∈M1 and
all m′2 ∈ M2, µ(m1,m2) ∗1 µ(m′1,m2) and µ(m1,m2) ∗2 µ(m1,m′2). Let N µ(∗) denote
the set of Nash equilibria of the mechanism µ at the profile ∗.
We now turn to the question of the domain of preferences to be considered. As
already mentioned we work under the assumption that preferences over alternatives
are strict, but we are flexible as to the way preferences are extended from alterna-
tives to lotteries. Since there are many ways to do so, we use a notion of admissible
extended preferences. Let κ(i) ⊆ P∆ be a set of admissible preferences over lot-
x ∈ A. Moreover, x i y and y i z implies x i z for all x,y,z ∈ A.
8While our results still hold extending over the whole simplex, the richness condition PREX be-
comes harder to satisfy. We would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta for pointing this out.
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teries of player i associated with i∈ LA. Abusing notation, let κ() ⊆ P 2∆ be the
set of admissible preference profiles over ∆ associated with the preference profile
= (1,2). Such a correspondence κ that associates to each preference a set of ex-
tended preferences (and to each profile of preference a set of profiles of extended
preferences) is called a domain of preference extensions. Throughout the paper
we use the property of Best-element bias: a player with a best-element bias prefers
the (sure) lottery that selects his best element in X to any (considered) lottery with
support in X.
Best-element bias: Let i∈ LA be a strict preference on A, and let ∆¯ ⊆ ∆ be a set of
lotteries. An extension ∗i of i exhibits the best element bias in ∆¯ when for any
X ∈ A with #X > 1 and any x ∈ X, if x i y for any y ∈ X \ {x}, then {x} ∗i p for all
p ∈ ∆¯ with supp(p) ⊆ X and p , {x}.
A domain κ is said to satisfy the best element bias (in short: κ satisfies BEB) in ∆¯
if, for any strict preference > ∈ LA, any extension ∗i ∈ κ(>) exhibit the best element
bias in ∆¯. Note that BEB is satisfied by virtually all domain of preference extensions
that are considered in the literature, including the von Neumann and Morgenstern
domain.
Given a domain κ, a mechanism µ is admissible iff for all ∈ L2A and all ∗∈ κ(),
N µ(∗) , ∅. It is deterministic-in-equilibrium (DE) iff for all ∈ L2A, all ∗∈ κ(),
and all m ∈ N µ(∗), #supp(µ(m)) = 1. It Nash-implements the SCR f : L2A → A
iff for all ∈ L2A and all ∗∈ κ(), f () =
⋃
m∈N µ(∗)
supp(µ(m)). Note that if µ Nash-
implements some SCR f , then µ is admissible.
3 Pareto efficient implementation
For any v = (v1,v2) ∈ {0,1, ..., n}2 with v1 + v2 = n, we define the Pareto-and-veto rule
pvv : L2A→A as the SCR:
7
pvv() =
Pareto︷︸︸︷
pe()∩
Veto︷                                                       ︸︸                                                       ︷
{x ∈ A | #L(x,1) ≥ v1}︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
Best n− v1 alternatives for 1
∩{x ∈ A | #L(x,2) ≥ v2}︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
Best n− v2 alternatives for 2
.
The Pareto-and-veto rule pvv picks all Pareto efficient alternatives with a lower-
contour set at least as large as vi for every player i.
Our first observation is that pvv is non empty when v1 + v2 ≤ n. To see this, just
observe that eliminating n alternatives at most, out of n+1, leaves at least one, say a.
If a is Pareto efficient, we are done. If not, a is Pareto-dominated by some a′ ∈ pev , but
since a′ is at least as good as a for player i, a is still among his n−vi best alternatives.
As soon as v1 + v2 is at least n + 1 , the example of completely opposed preferences
shows that pvv can be empty.
We now turn to the implementation pvv by a “strike” mechanism. For a strike
mechanism, given a strategy mj that vetoes some set of vj alternatives, the objective
for player i is to select the support of the lottery that determines the outcome. Let
gv(Mi ,mj) = {X ∈ A | supp(µv(mi ,mj)) = X for some mi ∈ Mi} be the attainable set
of player i at mj under the strike mechanism µv . So the set gv(Mi ,mj) contains the
different supports of the uniform lotteries that player i can induce when player j
selects mj under the strike mechanism µv . Because of the number of vetoes at his
disposal, player i can choose the support of the outcome by adequately casting his
vetoes as described by the following result:
Proposition 1. For each player i and each strategy mj ∈Mj , the attainable set equals:
gv(Mi ,mj) = {X ⊆ A \mj | 1 ≤ #X ≤min{n+ 1− vi ,n+ 1− vj}}.
Proof. Take some player i and some strategy mj ∈Mj . Take first the case with vi < vj
so that n+ 1 − vj < n + 1 − vi . We want to prove that for each non-empty X ⊆ A \mj
(hence with #X ≤ n+ 1 − vj), there is some mi ∈ Mi with supp(µv(mi ,mj)) = X. Note
that each non-empty subset of A \mj is of the form A \ (mj ∪ C) with 0 ≤ #C ≤ vi .
Thus, it suffices to pickmi such thatmi\mj = C which ensures that supp(µv(mi ,mj)) =
A \ (mi ∪mj) = A \ (mj ∪C), as required. In the case vi ≥ vj , take mi with mi \mj = C.
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Since vi ≥ vj , it follows that #C ≥ vi−vj and hence for each non-emptyX ⊆ A\mj with
#X ≤ n+1−vj−(vi−vj) = n+1−vi , there is somemi ∈Mi with supp(µv(mi ,mj)) = X.
Proposition 1’s main implication is that player i can induce any singleton inA\mj
as the support of the outcome: formally, for any player i and any alternative x ∈ A:
x ∈ A \mj =⇒ {x} ∈ gv(Mi ,mj).
Building on this key property of the attainable set, the rest of the section proves
that the strike mechanism µv Nash implements the Pareto-and-veto rule pvv . The
first consequence of this property is that strike mechanisms are deterministic in
equilibrium as long as the domain satisfies BEB.
Proposition 2. For any strike mechanism µv , if the domain κ satisfies BEB in the range
of µv , then µv is DE.
Proof. Assume that there is some equilibrium m = (m1,m2) with #supp (µv(m)) > 1.
Consider some player i and some alternative x ∈ supp(µv(m)) with x i y for all y ∈
supp(µv(m)) \ {x}. Since x ∈ A \mj , Proposition 1 shows that {x} ∈ gv(Mi ,mj). Thus,
there is some m′i ∈ Mi with µv(m′i ,mj) = {x}. Furthermore, {x} ∗i µv(m) due to BEB,
which contradicts that m is an equilibrium.
Since a strike mechanism is DE, no uncertainty remains in equilibrium: players
veto disjoint sets of alternatives and a unique alternative is selected. The next result
shows that any alternative selected by a Pareto-and-veto rule with veto vector v is se-
lected by some strict equilibrium of the strike mechanism µv . In a strict equilibrium,
the best response of each player is unique. Few games admit this sort of equilibria
and when they exist, strict equilibria have all the usual desiderata that the theory of
refinements requires9. As a by-product of our proof, we also obtain the admissibility
of each strike mechanism µv .
9In particular, a strict equilibrium is proper and hence perfect (see van Damme [1991] for a clas-
sic treatment). Note that equilibrium refinements rely on expected utility (to derive utility from
perturbed profiles) whereas most of our results do not depend on this assumption.
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Proposition 3. For any veto vector v, let the domain κ satisfyBEB in the range of µv , then
any Pareto-and-veto alternative x ∈ pvv() is the unique outcome of a strict equilibrium
of the strike mechanism µv .
Proof. Take any v ∈ {0, ..., n}2 with v1 + v2 = n, any  ∈ L2A, and any ∗∈ κ() with
κ satisfying BEB. Take x ∈ pvv(). Because x is Pareto-optimal, any of the n other
alternatives is either strictly better than x for one (and only one) player or strictly
worse for both. So counting these n = v1 + v2 alternatives we obtain:
v1 + v2 = #U (x,1) + #U (x,2) + #(L(x,1)∩L(x,2)) . (1)
By definition of pvv , v1 ≤ #L(x,1) = n − #U (x,1). Therefore v2 ≥ #U (x,1),
which means that player 2 has enough vetoes to block all the alternatives that player
1 strictly prefer to x. The same holds fo player 1 with respect to player 2. Writing
Equation (1) as:
[v1 −#U (x,2)] + [v2 −#U (x,1)] = #(L(x,1)∩L(x,2)) ,
one can see that it is possible to have players 1 and 2 respectively veto v1 −#U (x,2)
and v2−#U (x,1) different alternatives in L(x,1)∩L(x,2), so that all n alternatives
are vetoed by one player or the other.
Let m1 and m2 be such strategies. We now prove that, under BEB, m1 is a strict
best response to m2. To this end, recall that U (x,1) ⊆ m2: any alternative strictly
preferred by player 1 to x is vetoed by player 2. So when player 1 deviates to m′1 ∈
M1, the support A \ (m′1 ∪m2) of the outcome lottery excludes U (x,1). Because of
the constraints on the number of vetoes, µ(m′1,m2) = {x} is impossible for m′1 , m1.
Therefore, for player 1, the support of µ(m′1,m2) either contains only alternatives that
are strictly worse than x, or contains x and some other alternatives that all are worse
than x. By BEB, player 1 strictly prefers {x} to such outcomes, so m1 is the unique
best response to m2. The same holds for the other player, hence the result.
Equipped with this result, we are now ready to prove Theorem 1, according to
which the strike mechanism µ with veto vector v Nash-implements the Pareto-and-
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veto rule with the same veto vector v.
Theorem 1. Let the domain κ satisfy BEB in ∆uni. The strike mechanism µv Nash-
implements the Pareto-and-veto rule pvv for any v ∈ {0, ..., n}2 with v1 + v2 = n.
Proof. Take any v ∈ {0, ..., n}2 with v1 + v2 = n, any  ∈ L2A, and any ∗∈ κ(). Propo-
sition 3 establishes that pvv() ⊆ ⋃
m∈N µv (∗)
µv(m) provided that the domain κ satisfies
BEB in the range of µv . Moreover, it is easy to check that the range of µv is precisely
∆uni.
We now show pvv() ⊇ ⋃
m∈N µv (∗)
µv(m). Take some x with µv(m) = {x} for some
m ∈ N µv (∗). We first show that x ∈ pe(). Suppose not, i.e., there exists y ∈ A
with y i x for all i ∈ N . Since µv(m) = {x}, we have m1 ∩m2 = ∅. Thus, y ∈ mi for
some i ∈ N , say i = 1, without loss of generality. It follows that y ∈ A \m2 and thus
{y} ∈ gv(M1,m2). Therefore, µv(m′1,m2) = {y} for some m′1 and as {y} ∗1 µv(m) = {x},
we contradict m ∈ N µv (∗).
We now show #L(x,i) ≥ vi ∀i ∈ N . Suppose, without loss of generality, that
v1 > #L(x,1). For any m2 ∈ M2, there is some y ∈ A with y ∈ A \m2, y 1 z for
any z ∈ A \m2 and #L(y,1) ≥ n + 1 − v2 since m2 contains v2 vetoes. Remark that
n+ 1− v2 = v1 + 1 and thus y 1 x since #L(y,1) > #L(x,1) so {y} ∗i {x}. Moreover,
µv(m′1,m2) = {y} for some m′1 ∈M1 since y ∈ A\m2 and thus {y} ∈ gv(M1,m2). Finally
{y} ∗1 {x} = µv(m), contradicting that m is an equilibrium.
4 On the necessity of vetoes and the uniqueness of the
mechanism
We now turn to the uniqueness question. This section shows in which sense the
strike mechanism is the only possibility for Pareto-efficient Nash implementation.
4.1 Domain of extended preferences
We now define some conditions on the domain κ to be used throughout. The first
one restricts admissible extensions in the same spirit as the BEB condition. A player
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with a worst-element bias (or simply WEB) prefers any lottery with support in X to
the (sure) one that selects his worst element in X.
Worst-element bias: Let i∈ LA be a strict preference on A, and let ∆¯ ⊆ ∆ be a set of
lotteries. An extension ∗i of i exhibits the worst element bias in ∆¯ when for any
X ∈ A with #X > 1 and any x ∈ X, if y i x for any y ∈ X \ {x}, then p ∗i {x} for all
p ∈ ∆¯ with supp(p) ⊆ X and p , {x}.
As in the case of BEB, WEB is satisfied by virtually all preference extensions over
lotteries.10 We say that a domain κ satisfies WEB in ∆¯ iff WEB is satisfied in ∆¯ for
all ∗∈ κ(), for all ∈ L2A.
The next condition, Priority Extension, deals with the richness of the domain of
preference extensions. For any lottery p ∈ ∆, we write p[·  x] = ∑y:yx p(y) to refer
to the probability, according to p, of obtaining an alternative weakly preferred to x
according to .
Priority extension: Let ∗i extend i and let x ∈ A, the extension ∗i is a (PREX) of
i for x in ∆¯ iff given any two lotteries p,q ∈ ∆¯, if p[·  x] > 0 and q[·  x] = 0, then
p ∗ q.
The interpretation of this property is clear: under a priority extension, each al-
ternative is used as a grading benchmark: The individual prefers to reach the bench-
mark x, even with a tiny probability, than not reaching it. The argument “What is
the best alternative I have some chance to obtain with that lottery?” has priority over
the precise values of the probabilities. We say that a domain κ satisfies PREX in ∆¯
iff for all ∈ L2A, there is some ∗∈ κ() that is a priority extension of  in ∆¯ for all
x ∈ A.11
Here is an example of a domain of extension that satisfies the condition in the set
∆uni of uniform lotteries. Similar examples can be found for any finite set of lotteries.
Consider the correspondence κvNM : LA→ P∆uni that allows any von Neumann and
10In fact, BEB and WEB are satisfied if one considers the well-known preference extension axioms
of the literature (such as Gärdenfors [1976] or Kelly [1977]) and deduces preferences over lotteries
through the preferences over their supports. If κ satisfies BEB and WEB (which are universally
quantified), every sub-correspondence of κ satisfies them as well.
11Note that if x is bottom-ranked in , there is no lottery q with q[·  x] = 0, so that any extension
is (vacuously) a priority extension for x.
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Morgenstern extension of . In other words, for  ∈ LA, κvNM(>) is the set of all
∗ ∈ P∆uni such that there exists a vector u ∈ RA with a  b ⇐⇒ ua > ub for all a,b ∈ A
and:
∀p,q ∈ ∆uni, p ∗ q ⇐⇒
∑
a∈A
p(a)ua >
∑
a∈A
q(a)ua.
The domain κvNM(>) contains priority extensions of  to ∆uni. To see this, label
the alternatives in A according to the preference: an+1  an  . . .  a1 and let uak =
(n+ 1)k for any ak ∈ A. Take any pair p,q ∈ ∆uni with p[·  ak] > 0 and q[·  ak] = 0 for
some ak. The expected value of p, that is
∑
a∈Ap(a)ua, reaches its minimum when the
lottery contains in its support ak but no better alternative according to  (and hence
has k alternatives in its support). The expected value
∑
a∈Ap(a)ua is at least
uak
k
>
uak
k + 1
=
(n+ 1)k
k + 1
≥ (n+ 1)k−1.
The expected value of q,
∑
a∈A q(a)ua, reaches its maximum when q = {ak−1} and hence
its value is at most (n+ 1)k−1. Therefore, for any ak ∈ A, p[·  ak] > 0 and q[·  ak] = 0
implies that p ∗ q. Thus, uniform lotteries are ordered following the priority rule.
4.2 Implementable rules
We are now ready to state the counterpart to Theorem 1, according to which, if one
wants to implement Pareto efficient SCRs through a DE mechanism, the SCR must
be a Pareto-and-veto rule. Precisely we prove the following:
Theorem 2. Let f be a Pareto efficient SCR that is Nash-implementable by a DE mecha-
nism µ on a domain κ. Let the domain κ satisfy BEB, WEB and PREX in the range of µ.
Then f = pvv for some v ∈ {0, ..., n}2 with v1 + v2 = n.
To prepare for the proof we provide lemmas showing that we can restrict atten-
tion to “veto-neutral" mechanisms. For each player i, let
veto(Mi) = {X ∈ A | ∃mi ∈Mi s.t. supp(µ(mi ,mj))∩X = ∅ for all mj ∈Mj},
denote the veto set for player i. When X ∈ veto(Mi), we say that player i has veto
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power over the set X of alternatives, i.e., he has a strategy that ensures that no alter-
native in this set belongs to the support of the outcome independently of the strategy
of his opponent. We first state a result on the structure of the veto power that DE
mechanisms generate.
Lemma 1. Under the hypothesis of Theorem 2, for any partition {X,Y } of A with X ∈ A,
either Y ∈ veto(M1) or X ∈ veto(M2) but not both.
Proof. Let µ :M→ ∆ be admissible andDE and letX ∈ A. Write Y = A\X. Pick some
∈ L2A such that ∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ Y , x 1 y and y 2 x. The existence of such preference
 is ensured by our assumption that the domain contains all strict preferences on
alternatives. Take also ∗∈ κ() such that p ∗1 q for all p,q ∈ µ(M) with p[X] > 0 and
q[X] = 0, and such that p ∗2 q for all p,q ∈ µ(M) with p[Y ] > 0 and q[Y ] = 0. The
existence of such extended preference ∗ is ensured by PREX. Now suppose, for a
contradiction, that Y < veto(M1) and X < veto(M2). Because µ is admissible and DE,
there exists an equilibrium m = (m1,m2) ∈ N µ(∗) with µ(m) = {a} for some a ∈ A.
Two cases are possible:
• If a ∈ X. As Y < veto(M1), ∃m′2 ∈M2 such that supp
(
µ(m1,m′2)
)
∩Y , ∅, hence
µ(m1,m′2) ∗2 {a} due to WEB, contradicting m ∈Nµ(∗).
• If a ∈ Y . As X < veto(M2), ∃m′1 ∈M1 such that supp
(
µ(m′1,m2)
)
∩X ,∅, hence
µ(m′1,m2) ∗1 {a}, again contradicting m ∈ N µ(∗).
Thus, Y ∈ veto(M1) or X ∈ veto(M2). Because the mechanism is well-defined, it is
impossible that Y belongs to veto(M1) and its complement X belongs to veto(M2).
Therefore either Y ∈ veto(M1) or X ∈ veto(M2) but not both.
A mechanism µ is veto neutral for player i iff for any X ∈ A and any permutation
ρ : A → A, X ∈ veto(Mi) ⇐⇒ ρ(X) ∈ veto(Mi). When µ is veto neutral for some
player i, if a set with a given cardinality belongs to veto(Mi) then any other set with
the same cardinality belongs to veto(Mi) as well. Note that a player with veto power
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over X has also veto power over any X ′ ⊂ X. Hence, the veto set for player i can be
written as:
veto(Mi) = {X ∈ A | #X ≤ vi},
where the integer vi stands for the cardinality of the highest cardinality set over
which i has veto power.
Lemma 2. Under the hypothesis of Theorem2, µ is veto neutral for both players.
Proof. Let X ∈ veto(M1), x ∈ X and x′ ∈ A \ X.12 Thus, there exists m1 ∈ M1 that
vetoes X. The set X ′ = X\{x}∪{x′} has the same cardinal as X. Write Y = A\(X∪{x′}),
so that we have a partition
A = (X \ {x})∪ {x} ∪ {x′} ∪Y .
Suppose, for a contradiction, thatX ′ < veto(M1). Lemma 1 then implies that Y∪{x} ∈
veto(M2). Therefore there exists m2 ∈ M2 that vetoes Y ∪ {x}. Since x′ is neither
vetoed by m1 nor by m2, µ(m1,m2) = {x′}. Now consider a unanimous preference
profile = (1,2) such that x i x′ i y for all y , x,x′and for i = 1,2. For this
preference profile, the second-best alternative x′ is Pareto-dominated by x but, at
(m1,m2), both players veto x. Thus, no unilateral deviation can obtain, with any
probability, a better outcome than x′. Thanks to BEB, that implies that (m1,m2) is a
Nash equilibrium, in contradiction with the Pareto efficiency assumption.
The proof of the proposition is established by noting that given any X,X ′ ∈ A
with #X = #X ′, there is a finite sequence of sets X = X1, ...,Xs = X ′ with #(Xi∩X ′i+1) =
#X − 1 for each i ∈ {1, ..., s − 1} and applying repeatedly the argument above.
We can now complete the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first establish the existence of v such that f ⊆ pvv . Let M
be the joint message space of µ that DE-implements f . Take any preference profile
= (1,2) and any x ∈ f (). For each i with i = 1,2, let ∗1 denote its associated
PREX for x. Thus, for all p,q ∈ µ(M), for each z ∈ A and for i = 1,2, if p[· i z] > 0
12The two extreme cases veto(M1) = {{∅}} and A ∈ veto(M1) are trivial.
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and q[· i z] = 0 then p ∗i q. Since x ∈ f (), µ admits a Nash equilibrium (m1,m2)
with µ(m1,m2) = {x}. By the definition of an equilibrium, player 2 has no better
response to m1 than m2. However, under ∗2, a deviation m′2 is profitable for player
2 iff supp(µ(m1,m′2))∩U (2,x) , ∅. Therefore:
∀m2 ∈M2, supp(µ(m1,m2))∩U (2,x) = ∅
and likewise for player 1. In other words, m1 makes the set U (2,x) unattainable for
player 2 under µ. We say that m1 gives player 1 veto power on the set U (2,x), and
likewise for player 2.
From Lemma 2, if a player has veto power on some set, she has also veto power
on any set of the same cardinality. Let vi be the largest number of outcomes that i
can veto. For the mechanism to be well-defined, one needs v1 +v2 ≤ n, so that not all
the n+ 1 alternatives can be vetoed simultaneously. The existence of a deterministic
equilibrium (an equilibrium with a singleton outcome) shows that v1 + v2 ≥ n.
Clearly, an outcome that would be among the vi worse alternatives for a player
i cannot be an equilibrium outcome under µ because i could then veto her vi worse
alternatives. Due to WEB, a player prefers any lottery with support not included
in the vi worst alternatives to any lottery that selects (surely) one of the worst vi
alternatives. Hence f being implementable imposes the required veto conditions on
the ranks of the implemented alternatives in the individual preferences. Since we
assumed that f is also efficient, we obtain f ⊆ pvv .
For this v, we now prove the reverse inclusion. Given = (1,2), let x ∈ pvv().
Consider the profile ′ defined as follows.
Label the n+ 1 alternatives in two ways: an+1 1 an 1 . . . 1 a1 and bn+1 2 bn 2
. . . 2 b1. Write aw1 = bw2 = x. The veto conditions in the definition of pvv are that
w1 > v1 and w2 > v2, which implies that:
an+1 1 . . . 1 aw1 = x 1 . . . 1 av1 1 . . . 1 a1,
bn+1 2 . . . 2 bw2 = x 2 . . . 2 bv2 2 . . . 2 b1.
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The preference ′1 is obtained by lowering the ranks of all those, among the alter-
natives av1+1, ..., aw1−1, which are preferred to x by the other player, player 2. If
w1 = v1 + 1 we simply let ′1 = 1. If w1 ≥ v1 + 2, consider the set
H1 =
{
av1+1, . . . , aw1−1
}
∩ {bw2+1, . . . , bn+1}
and observe that
#H1 ≤ n−w2 ≤ n− v2 = v1.
Starting from 1, we define ′1 by switching in the ranking the first elements a1,...
a#H1 with the elements of H1, where a1 is switched with the most preferred element
of H1 of player 1, a2 is switched with the second most preferred element of H1 of
player 1 and so on...
We now claim that if x ∈ f (′1,2) then x ∈ f (). Let µ DE-implement f . If
x ∈ f (′1,2), there exists a pure strategy equilibrium (m′1,m′2) for the game with
preferences (′1,2) with {x} = µ(m′1,m′2). With the initial preferences (1,2), m2 is
also a best response since player 2 does not change her preference, and m′1 is also a
best response for player 1 because her preferences differ only below x. As previously
argued,m2 gives player 2 veto power on the setU (1,x). SinceU (′1,x) =U (1,x) by
construction, it follows that the support of any lottery that player 1 can attain given
m2 is included in A \U (1,x). Hence, due to BEB, m1 is a best response for player
1 since µ(m1,m2) = {x}. Therefore this equilibrium for (′1,2) is also an equilibrium
for (1,2), that is: x ∈ f (′) =⇒ x ∈ f ().
The same construction for player 2 yields the preference profile ′′= (′1,′2) with
the property:
x ∈ f (′′) =⇒ x ∈ f (). (2)
But notice that, by construction of ′1, all the alternatives y such that y 2 x are now
among the v1 worse alternatives according to ′1. Therefore x is the preferred alter-
native, according to ′2, among the alternatives in the intersection of the top n − v1
alternatives for player 1 and n − v2 alternatives for player 2 in ′. Since the same is
true for the other player, we find that x is the unique Pareto optimum in the alter-
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natives among the top n− v1 alternatives for player 1 and the top n− v2 alternatives
for player 2 in  ”. Since f itself is assumed to be efficient and is selecting in pvv , we
obtain that f (′′) = {x}. From (2) it follows that x ∈ f (v) as requested.
Theorem 2 shows the existence of a strong link between implementation through
DE mechanisms and veto power. Indeed, it shows that under the conditions BEB,
WEB, and PREX, a SCR has to admit some veto structure in order to be both Pareto
efficient and implementable. This theorem is related to the impossibility result by
Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] in the following sense. Hurwicz and Schmeidler
[1978] show that the only SCRs which are both Pareto efficient and implementable
(through a deterministic mechanism) are the dictatorial ones. Note that a dictato-
rial SCR corresponds to pvv with v = (n,0) (if player 1 is the dictator) or v = (0,n)
(if player 2 is the dictator). Our theorem shows that by allowing lotteries as off-
equilibrium punishments, the Pareto-and-veto rules appear as a class of intermedi-
ate and, interestingly, non dictatorial SCRs.
Note that pvv is neutral for any v ∈ {0...,n}2 and that it is anonymous if and only if
v1 = v2. Thus, under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the following observations triv-
ially follow. With an odd number of alternatives, an anonymous, neutral and Pareto
efficient SCR f is Nash-implementable by a DE mechanism iff f is a Pareto-and-veto
rule with v1 = v2. On the contrary, with an even number of alternatives, there exist
no anonymous, neutral and Pareto efficient SCR that is Nash-implementable by a
DE mechanism.
4.3 Maskin Monotonicity
Maskin Monotonicity has played a key role in the development of implementation
theory. It stands as the necessary condition for implementation through determin-
istic mechanisms: if a SCR is implementable, then it satisfies this condition. As
we show, this statement also applies to the current setting. Formally, a SCR f is
Maskin Monotonic iff for any x ∈ A and any ,′∈ L2A with L(x,i) ⊆ L(x,′i) ∀i ∈N ,
x ∈ f () =⇒ x ∈ f (′). Maskin monotonic is satisfied by each Pareto-and-veto rule as
shown by the next lemma.
18
Lemma 3. For any veto vector v, the Pareto-and-veto rule pvv is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. For any veto vector v, take any ∈ L2A and any x ∈ pvv(). Let ′∈ L2A be some
profile with L(x,i) ⊆ L(x,′i) ∀i ∈ N . Note that x ∈ pe() implies that x ∈ pe(′).
Moreover, #L(x,′i) ≥ #L(x,i) for each i ∈N (by construction of ′) and #L(x,i) ≥ vi
∀i ∈N (by the definition of pvv). Thus x ∈ pvv(′), as desired.
If the domain satisfies BEB, WEB and PREX, a Pareto efficient SCR that is Nash-
implementable by a DE mechanism is a Pareto-and-veto rule (as stated by Theorem
2). Since any such rule is Maskin monotonic, we conclude that Maskin monotonicy
is still necessary for implementation with DE mechanisms.
5 Iterative best responses
As mentioned above the equilibria of the considered game are pure and strict. This
ensures that the usual game-theoretical refinement criteria are satisfied. However,
what does this imply concerning the use of veto mechanisms in laboratory experi-
ments or in real-life applications? Fudenberg and Levine [2016] argue that an equi-
librium often fails to arise from introspection, but rather from some non-equilibrium
learning dynamics. Moreover, as they write, "in laboratory games do not usually re-
semble Nash equilibrium (except in some special cases); instead, there is abundant
experimental evidence that play in many games moves toward equilibrium as sub-
jects play the game repeatedly and receive feedback" (see Van Huyck et al. [1990]
for a classic treatment and Goeree and Yariv [2011] and Chan et al. [2017] for recent
treatments).
In this section we consider the simplest learning dynamics (best responses). Since
there may multiple equilibria in the game-form associated to a strike mechanism,
there is no hope that the synchronous best response dynamics converge necessar-
ily. If (m1,m2) and (m′1,m′2) are two different equilibria then the sequence (m1,m′2),
(m′1,m2), (m1,m′2), (m′1,m2), ... is such that each player best-responses to her oppo-
nent’s previous moves, but they never coordinate (This remark is very general: it
holds for any two player game with multiple equilibria). We thus consider alternate
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best response dynamics and show that these processes lead to our equilibria. That
point underlines the relevance of our mechanisms in applied settings.
Alternate best responses dynamics. Letm0,m1,m2,m3, ... be a sequence of messages
from alternating players. Say, for instance, and without loss of generality, that player
2 plays m0, m2, etc. Suppose that for any t ≥ 1, mt is a best response (for player 1 if t
is odd and for player 2 if t is even) to mt−1. So #mt is equal to v1 for t odd and to v2
for t even.
First notice that, thanks to our strict preferences assumption (BEB), best re-
sponses are unique. Precisely, when player i is facing a veto on the vj alternatives
mt−1, her best response is to pick her unique preferred alternative among the re-
maining set A \mt−1 and to veto the other vi alternatives. Thus the whole sequence
is uniquely defined by its first element m0, and we have, for any t ≥ 1:
mt−1 ∩mt = ∅. (3)
Let rt for t ≥ 1 denotes the outcome at date t; this is the unique alternative such
that:
mt−1 ∪mt ∪ {rt} = A.
By definition, both mt and mt+2 contain vj alternatives. However, as previously
mentioned, mt and mt+1 are disjoint, and so are mt+1 and mt+2. Therefore, both mt
and mt+2 contain vj alternatives from the set A \mt+1, which contains n− vi alterna-
tives. Thus, since vi + vj = n − 1, mt and mt+2 differ on at most one alternative. If
mt = mt+2, an equilibrium is reached. If mt , mt+2 then mt and mt+2 differ on one
alternative exactly.
The following property of the best response correspondence is used in our proof
of convergence. Suppose that one alternative, say a, is erased from the set A. In case
a ∈ mt−1, the best response to m˜t−1 = mt−1 \ {a} is the same mt. In case a < mt−1 and
a ∈ mt+1, the best response to m˜t−1 = mt−1 is m˜t = mt \ {a}, and is the best response
of the same player in the modified game where a is not available and the player has
one veto less.
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We now prove that the sequence of best responses leads to an equilibrium in at
most n iterations. Let an denote the worst alternative for player 1. If for some k ≥ 0,
an < m2k, then the best response for player 1 implies to veto an, that is: an ∈ m2k+1.
This in turn implies (because of property 3) that player 2 does not veto an at date
2k + 2. It follows that the following chain holds: for all t ≥ 0
an <mt =⇒ an ∈mt+1 =⇒ an <mt+2 =⇒ ...
Consequently, an belongs either to all mt for t odd and starting at 1 (call this case 1),
or to all mt for t even and starting at 2 (call this case 2).
Now consider the sequence of sets m˜t = mt \ {an} for all t ≥ 1. We claim that this
new sequence is again a sequence of alternating best responses in the game where the
set of alternatives is A \ {an} and the numbers of vetoes are, in case 1, v′ = (v1 − 1,v2)
and in case 2, v′ = (v1,v2−1). This is true in case 1 because, in the original sequence,
player 1 always had to veto an that is her worst alternative and player 2 never had
to block a1 that is never available to her. This is also true in case 2 because, in the
original sequence, player 1 never had to veto an that was never available to her, and
player 2 always had to veto an.
The same logic applies to the worst element for the other player as well. The
argument can be repeated for player 1 or for player 2 until all vetoes are exhausted
and about the sequences starting at m1 then at m˜2, then at ˜˜m3, etc. It follows that in
the original sequence, for all t ≥ n, mt =mt+2. We conclude that the iterative process
of alternate best responses converges to an equilibrium in at most n iterations.
6 Ex-ante Pareto efficiency
This section shows that ensuring ex-ante Pareto efficient equilibria throughDEmech-
anisms is in general not possible. It presents two separate results for two notions:
ex-ante efficiency for mechanisms (Section 6.1) and for SCRs (Section 6.2). The first
one shows that no ex-ante Pareto efficient admissible mechanism ensures minimal
veto rights to each player. The second one proves that any ex-ante Pareto efficient
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and implementable SCR is a dictatorship.
6.1 Ex-ante efficient mechanisms
Ex-ante efficiency means that efficiency is observed at the level of lotteries, before
their realization. Received knowledge on this issue (see, for instance, Börgers and
Postl [2009]) highlights that ex-ante efficiency is difficult to obtain. An example
is published (Núñez and Laslier [2015]) of an ex-ante Pareto efficient two-player
mechanism for three alternatives; this mechanism, called Approval mechanism, is
not DE and fails to be efficient for four alternatives or more. The existence of a
non-DE efficient mechanism for many alternatives a remains an open problem.
The difficulty can be described by the following argument. Let A = {a,b,c} with
a 1 b 1 c and c 2 b 2 a. Consider the strike mechanism that gives one veto to
each player. If the domain κ satisfies BEB, the unique equilibrium outcome is b.
Now, assume that both players prefer a non degenerate lottery with support {a,c}
to the pure outcome b. This is the case when both players extend their preference
over alternatives to uniform lotteries through expected utility and their intensity
of preference for b is low. In this case, the unique equilibrium outcome is Pareto
dominated by a lottery, that is a possible outcome of the mechanism, therefore non
dictatorial ex-ante Pareto efficiency cannot be reached with deterministic outcomes.
Our first result is a negative result, that generalizes this observation to veto rules, as
studied in this paper.
Instead of social choice rules, defined on profiles of preferences over pure alter-
natives, we are here dealing with social lottery rules (SLR), defined on profiles of
preferences over lotteries. For such a preference profile, ∗, the SLR F defines a set
of lotteries F(∗) ⊆ ∆. We will consider SLRs that are defined on the same domains
that were used in the previous sections: preferences over pure alternatives are strict,
and all strict preferences are admitted, and the preferences on lotteries are described
by a product correspondence κ.
For a mechanism µ and a profile of preferences over alternatives ∗, let Fµ(∗)
denote the set of Nash outcomes: Fµ(∗) = {µ(m) : m ∈ Nµ(∗)}. This is a subset of
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µ(M), the range of µ. A mechanism µ is ex-ante Pareto efficient on the domain κ
if for any ∈ L2A and any ∗∈ κ() there is no p ∈ µ(M) and q ∈ Fµ(∗) such that
p ∗i q for all i with at least one strict preference. Say that µ is DE at ∗ if all its
Nash outcomes are deterministic, that is, with our loose notation: Fµ(∗) ⊆ A. A
mechanism µ is a dictatorship iff there is some i ∈ N such that for each x ∈ A, there
exists mi ∈Mi such that µ(mi ,mj) = {x} for all mj ∈Mj .
Theorem 3. Let the domain κ satisfy PREX and WEB. On κ, any admissible DE mech-
anism that is ex-ante Pareto-efficient is a dictatorship.
Proof. Suppose first that the mechanism µ is not purely deterministic, that is there
exists a strategy combination m∗ ∈M and two distinct alternatives a1, an+1 ∈ A such
that {a1, an+1} ⊆ supp(µ(m∗)). Since µ is DE, it follows that Fµ(∗) ⊆ A. Write A =
{a1, a2, ..., an+1} (recall that n+1 ≥ 3) and consider the opposed preferences = (1,2)
with a1 1 a2 1 ... 1 an+1 and an+1 2 an 2 ... 2 a1. Let the players’ preferences
over lotteries, ∗1 and ∗2, be such that, for any p,q ∈ µ(M), if p[· 1 a1] > 0 and
q[· 1 a1] = 0 then p ∗1 q, and if p[· 2 an+1] > 0 and q[· 2 an+1] = 0 then p ∗2 q. Such
a profile exists because the domain κ satisfies PREX. Therefore, since {a1, an+1} ⊆
supp(µ(m∗)), µ(m∗) ∗i {x} for i = 1,2 and any x , a1, an+1. Since µ is ex-ante Pareto
efficient, it follows that Fµ(∗) ⊆ {a1, an+1}.
Therefore, at this profile, the mechanism µ admits either {a1} or {an+1} or both
as equilibrium outcome. Assume w.l.og. that µ admits some equilibrium m˜ with
µ(m˜) = {a1}. By definition of equilibrium, {a1} = µ(m˜) ∗2 µ(m˜1,m′2) for any m′2 ∈ M2.
Yet, since κ satisfies WEB, then p ∗2 {a1} for all p ∈ µ(M) with p , {x}. Therefore,
µ(m˜1,m′2) = {a1} for any m′2 ∈ M2. It follows that for every a ∈ A, there is either
some m1 ∈M1 such that µ(m1,m′2) = {a} for any m′2 ∈M2 or some m2 ∈M2 such that
µ(m′1,m2) = {a} for any m′1 ∈ M1. It follows that either for every a ∈ A there is some
m1 ∈ M1 such that µ(m1,m′2) = {a} for any m′2 ∈ M2 or for every a ∈ A there is some
m2 ∈ M2 such that µ(m′1,m2) = {a} for any m′1 ∈ M1. In the first case, player 1 is the
dictator and in the second case player 2 is the dictator.
Suppose now that there is no m∗ ∈M such that supp(µ(m∗)) ⊃ {x,y} for some pair
of alternatives {x,y} ∈ A. Then, for any m ∈ M, µ(m) ∈ A so that µ is a determinis-
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tic mechanism and µ(M) ⊆ A. Thus, for any N µ(∗) = N µ() for any ∗∈ κ() and
any ∈ L2A. Hence, ex-ante Pareto efficient is equivalent to Pareto efficiency w.r.t. .
Thus, the two-person implementation problem (as stated by Hurwicz and Schmei-
dler [1978] and Maskin [1999]) applies: the only mechanisms that are admissible
and Pareto efficient are dictatorships.
6.2 Ex-ante efficiency of implementable social choice rules
The literature on implementation has concentrated on social choice rules (SCRs)
which, by definition use only cardinal information: a preference profile  on alter-
natives, and not a preference profile ∗ over lotteries. Since we consider mechanisms
that can outcome lotteries, some definitions are useful in order to make the link with
this literature.
So consider a SCR f : for all ∈ L(A), f () ⊆ A. A mechanism µ that is DE on a
domain κ is said to implement the SCR f on κ iff:
∀ ∈ L(A), ∀ ∗∈ κ(), Fµ(∗) = f ().
Note that, for a mechanism to implement a social choice rule, it is required that the
outcomes of the mechanism not only are deterministic, but also are independent of
the precise preferences over lotteries. The following definition presents a concept of
ex-ante Pareto efficient SCR that is suitable for the study of the implementation of
SCRs by mechanisms that can output lotteries. It should not be confused with the
concept of an ex-ante Pareto efficient mechanism defined above.
Given a set of lotteries ∆ ⊆ ∆ a SCR f is ex-ante Pareto efficient in the range ∆
iff given any ∈ L2A and any ∗ in κ(), any X ∈ f () and any x ∈ X, there is no p ∈ ∆
such that p ∗i x for all i ∈N with at least one strict preference.
We show that the notions of ex-ante Pareto efficiency and admissibility clash,
hence extending the two-player implementation problem to the setting with lotteries
and DE mechanisms. This shows that ex-ante Pareto efficiency is too restrictive in
our setting.
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Theorem 4. Let f be a SCR that is Nash-implementable by a DE mechanism µ on a
domain κ. Suppose that κ satisfies PREX and WEB in the range of µ. If f is ex-ante
Pareto efficient in the range of µ, then µ is a dictatorship.
Proof. Let f be an ex-ante Pareto efficient SCR that is Nash-implementable by a DE
mechanism µ on a domain κ. Borrowing the vocabulary of Hurwicz and Schmeidler
[1978], we think of the mechanism µ as a matrix where player 1 controls rows and
player 2 controls columns. We hence write, for every x ∈ X, an {x}-row is a row that
contains only {x} as an outcome and similarly for an {x}-column.
Take any profile ∈ L2A. Let a and b respectively denote the best outcomes for
player 1 and 2 at . Take ∗∈ κ() such that p ∗1 q for all p,q ∈ µ(M) with p(a) > 0
and q(a) = 0 and such that p ∗2 q for all p,q ∈ µ(M) with p(b) > 0 and q(b) = 0. The
existence of ∗ is ensured by PREX. Take any alternative x , a,b. According to ∗
both players strictly prefer a lottery with support {a,b} to the pure alternative x. Ex-
ante Pareto efficiency thus implies that x < f (). Indeed, if x ∈ f (), then µ admits
an equilibrium m∗ with µ(m∗) = {x} (since µ is DE). However, both players prefer the
lottery {a,b} to x, contradicting ex-ante Pareto efficiency. So f () ⊆ {a,b}. Thus, an
ex-ante Pareto optimal and admissible DE mechanism gives equilibrium outcomes
from the union of tops.
Now consider a preference profile  where the players’ preferences are com-
pletely opposed. Relabel the alternatives as a1, a2,..., am. Take a preference profile
where a1 and a2 are respectively the best and last alternatives for player 1 while a2
and a1 are, respectively, the best and last alternatives for player 2. So the equilib-
rium outcomes of µ belong to {a1, a2}. Note that µ is DE, so no lottery with support
{a1, a2} is an equilibrium outcome. Let, without loss of generality, a1 be an equilib-
rium outcome. This is the worst element for player 2 and also the worst lottery (due
to WEB), hence player 1 must have an {a1}-row.
Now, take a preference profile where a2 and a3 are, respectively, the best and last
alternatives for player 1 while a3 and a2 are the respective top and bottom outcomes
for player 2. So the equilibrium outcomes of µ belong to {a2, a3}. We first show that
a3 cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Suppose it is. As a3 is the worst element
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and lottery for player 1, player 2 must have an {a3}-column, due to WEB, which
contradicts player 1 has an {a1}-row. As a result, a2 is an equilibrium outcome and
we argue, mutatis mutandis, player 1 has an a2-row.
Iterate by making the arguments for a3, a4, . . . , am−1, am, proves that for each a ∈ A,
player 1 has an {a}-row, showing that player 1 is the dictator. Repeating the argument
assuming that a2 is an equilibrium outcome shows that player 2 is the dictator.
7 Review of the literature
This section provides a short review of the two-player implementation problem (see
Dutta [2019] for a recent and complete survey). As argued in the introduction, the
pioneering works (Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] and Maskin [1999]) provide a
provocative result: dictatorships are the only Pareto efficient rules that can be Nash
implemented. Their proof builds on three key assumptions: (i) the preference do-
main is universal (any preference profile is allowed) while implementing mecha-
nisms are (ii) simultaneous and (iii) deterministic.
The literature has explored the consequences of weakening each of these assump-
tion.13 The first strand relaxes condition (i), Dutta and Sen [1991] and Moore and
Repullo [1990] are the key papers in this direction. They identify the domain re-
strictions under which one can design Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial Nash-
implementable rules. While the full characterization is rather complex, the suffi-
cient domain conditions for implementation often rely in the Euclidean space (see
Section 5 in Dutta and Sen [1991] for instance); in the current work, we work in a set-
ting where we do not impose any structure on the alternatives or on the preferences
over them, beyond the fact that that preferences over alternatives are strict.
A second strand is concerned with (ii), that is, replacing simultaneous with dy-
namic mechanisms. This literature, in which Moore and Repullo [1988], Abreu and
Sen [1991] and Herrero and Srivastava [1992] play a key role, shows that introducing
an order of play expands the set of implementable rules with more than two players.
13Other approaches have modified the rationality notion, using “partial honesty”; see Dutta and
Sen [2012] among others.
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No characterization of implementable rules via subgame-perfect or via backward
induction is available. By altering the notion of implementation (role-robust imple-
mentation), De Clippel et al. [2014]14 show that a possibility arises with dynamic
vetoes and randomized order of play (see also Barberà and Coelho [2019] who con-
sider the implementation of the fallback-bargaining solution). However, while ex-
ante fairness is achieved by randomizing the order of play, ex-post fairness fails. The
order of play matters for determining the outcome, creating first, or second, mover
advantages. As Moulin [1981] puts it, "voting by veto procedures introduce a strong
asymmetry among agents: ... the ordering of the agents has a strong influence on the
outcome" (see also Barberà and Coelho [2018] on first/second mover advantages).
The third and final strand of the literature deals with assumption (iii), as does
the current work: it explores the consequences of modifying the type of mechanisms
jointly with the notion of implementation.15 Indeed, virtual implementation is a re-
formulation of the original problem: a social choice rule is virtually implementable
if there exists a game form G, such that for all preference profiles G admits a unique
equilibrium outcome (a lottery) which is ε-close to the outcome prescribed by the
rule at this preference profile and this holds for every ε > 0. Following this ap-
proach, Matsushima [1988] and Abreu and Sen [1991] provide a strong possibility
result: with at least three players, any rule is implementable. With two players, the
result is more nuanced but some SCRs are virtually implementable (among which
the Pareto-and-veto rule described in the current work). However, under the virtual
implementation approach, "any alternative can be the outcome of the game as it re-
ceives positive probability in the equilibrium lottery" (Bochet and Maniquet [2010]).
In other words, in order to virtually implement a social choice rule, one constructs
game forms whose equilibrium outcome at every preference profile is a full-support
14A classic literature considers sequential voting by veto with many players (see Mueller [1978],
Moulin [1981], Bloom and Cavanagh [1986a], Bloom and Cavanagh [1986b], Felsenthal and Ma-
chover [1992] and Anbarci [2006]) where each player is assigned a certain number of vetoes to be
distributed freely among the alternatives. See also the rules ok k-names (Barberà and Coelho [2010],
Barberà and Coelho [2017]).
15See also the papers on approval voting with two players as Núñez and Laslier [2015] and Laslier
et al. [2017]. See also Jackson and Sonnenschein [2007] who show that linking decisions (that is, a
common decision on several independent problems) can help overcoming incentive constraints in
Bayesian collective decision problems.
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lottery, arbitrarily close to the outcome prescribed by the social choice rule. This
represents a threat to the relevance of these solutions since it involves that socially
undesirable alternative, even with a small probability, can be selected.
8 Concluding remarks
Strike mechanisms arise as a solution to the two-person implementation problem.
This solution is obtained by altering two key elements of the classic framework: (i)
considering mechanisms that allow in equilibrium pure alternatives and off equilib-
rium lotteries and (ii) restricting efficiency to the ex-post Pareto notion.
Our class of DE mechanisms is a simultaneous version of the dynamic veto mech-
anisms (see Moulin [1981]) which, by allowing off-equilibrium set-valued outcomes,
resolve the unfairness generated by dynamic mechanisms. To see the difference be-
tween our solution and the one based on dynamic veto mechanisms, consider a dy-
namic game that allows player 1 to veto n+1−k alternatives and player 2 to veto k−1
of the remaining k alternatives, where k ∈ {1, . . . ,n+ 1}. At each preference profile ,
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game is the most preferred alter-
native of player 1 among pvv() where v1 = n+ 1− k and v2 = k − 1. In other words,
this dynamic veto mechanism subgame perfect implements a subcorrespondence of
pvv by refining it with respect to the true preference of the first mover. One could
argue that fairness here could be achieved by selecting randomly the first-mover.
Yet, this needs qualification since this randomization prevents some alternatives to
arise as the following example shows. When A = {a,b,c,d,e}, at the preference profile
a 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e and c 2 b 2 a 2 d 2 e, the dynamic veto mechanism which
gives 2 vetoes to each voter implements, by alternating first movers, either a or c but
excludes b. However, pvv picks all three of a, b and c. Thus, our simultaneous di-
rect veto mechanisms allow for the implementation of the compromise alternative b
whereas their dynamic counterparts fail to do so. This constitutes a strong argument
in favor of using simultaneous mechanisms.
We close by noting three limitations of our analysis. First, it is restricted to Nash
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implementation in pure strategies. Allowing for mixed strategies and exploring the
existence of interestingDEmechanisms for settings with two ore more players seems
to be a promising research avenue (see Mezzetti and Renou [2012]). Second, the set
of implementable SCRs expands if one considers implementation through non-DE
mechanisms. Indeed, as long as BEB holds, the game-form associated to plurality
rule Nash implements the union of tops16 which selects at each preference profile all
alternatives that are top-ranked by at least one player.17 Third, we have considered
implementation through ex-post Pareto efficient DE mechanisms. Other notions of
efficiency are present in the literature such as stochastic dominance. Whether other
SCRs can be Nash implemented through DE mechanisms by considering different
notions of efficiency remains to be explored.
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